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The relationship between Marxism and psychoanalysis has been frequently debated;
nonetheless, one rarely comes upon a thoroughgoing, in-depth treatment of this
connection. The Capitalist Unconscious is therefore a belated but welcome inquiry
into the points of intersection between the two, a project whose contours could be
traced back to the works of Marx and Freud. It is in the work of Lacan, however,
that this correlation between Marxism and Psychoanalysis becomes visible. This
article explores Samo Tomšič’s analysis of the logical, epistemological, and political
continuity of Marx’s critique of political economy and Freud’s theory of libidinal
economy, meanwhile appraising the possible emancipatory potential of this project.
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For anyone concerned with a possible meeting point between Marxism and psycho-
analysis, The Capitalist Unconscious is a long-awaited work. The intricacy of the
task of bringing together Marx and Lacan in a systematic way is indeed tackled in
the beginning of the book. From biographical instances such as Lacan’s dismissal of
the May 1968 event (a gesture more reminiscent of liberal nouveaux philosophes
than revolutionary thinkers) to general criticisms pitted against psychoanalysis as a
watchdog of the mental health of the bourgeois class or advocate of the capitalist nor-
malisation of desire, the text does not shy away from dissection of examples that testify
against a possible happy union between Marxism and psychoanalysis. The question is
inevitably posed: ‘If psychoanalysis recurrently appears as a form of sophistry that
relativises the scope of leftist political struggles and questions their resistance to capi-
talist forms of exploitation, then why argue for its continued political relevance?’ (p. 2).
Nonetheless, Tomšič’s impressive theoretical toolbox enables him to brush aside
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biographical and stereotypical contexts and delve into the philosophical potential of
Lacan’s entanglement with Marx’s critique of political economy.
At stake in The Capitalist Unconscious is the production of capitalist subjectivity,
namely, the kind of subjectivity involved in the autonomy of exchange value and dom-
ination of the commodity form. The point of departure for this approach is the par-
allelism between Marxism and psychoanalysis in their recognition of a ‘structural
negativity’ (p. 5). Marx’s critique of the fetishism of political economy entails a critique
of a positive conception of value as a vital force (of capital, money, economy), since in
his critique value is not perceived as some positive substance but in terms of logic. For
Both Marx and Lacan the guide to political universality is a negative, non-narcissistic
subjectivity, which counters the capitalist repudiation of negativity. The negativity dis-
avowed by capitalism, however, always returns in the shape of the production of
surplus populations globally. Marx’s localisation of labour-power as a structural nega-
tivity, where the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production coalesce, unfolds a
category of de-psychologised and de-individualised subject that is translatable to the
subject of the unconscious in the Freudian–Lacanian parlance.
The book therefore traces the link between Marx and Freud to the Freudian theory
of the unconscious, the formulation of which became possible after what Louis Althus-
ser terms Marx’s ‘epistemological break’ (p. 10). The heart of the matter is that Freud’s
theory of the unconscious accentuates ‘the role of labour (Arbeit) in the satisfaction of
the unconscious tendency (desire or drive) and that it constantly uncovers the pro-
ductive dimension of the unconscious’ (p. 11). As distinct from the Jungian notion
of collective unconscious, Freud underscores a labour theory of the unconscious.
Lacan’s contribution consists in his incorporation of the Freudian concepts of libido
(psychic energy) and the unconscious labour in the category of jouissance (enjoy-
ment). The signiﬁcance of the category of jouissance is that its production goes
beyond the homeostatic model—it knows no right measure, in Freud’s words
(p. 64). To be more precise, the structural loss or negativity that Freud theorises in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) reveals the gaps of libidinal economy and embo-
dies a critique of the homeostatic model, which more or less foregrounds economic
liberalism. Likewise, Marx’s refutation of ‘the political–economic fantasies of social
homeostasis and market providence’ inspired Lacan, allowing him to formalise the
contradictions of the linguistic idea of the autonomy of the signiﬁer (p. 203).
In The Capitalist Unconscious, Lacan’s infamous ‘excommunication’ from the Inter-
national Psychoanalytic Association in 1963 is regarded as a prelude to ‘a second
return to Freud’, which came to fruition immediately after May 1968, and was reﬂected
in his substitution of structural linguistics (with which he had been initially preoccu-
pied) by Marxian critique of political economy. Implicit in this passage from Saus-
sure’s and Jakobson’s theories of language to Marxian political economy after 1968
is a certain degree of politicisation, albeit that the sediment of political events mani-
fested itself in Lacan’s theory rather than political leaning. The conceptual incentive
for this shift stemmed from the limitations of structural linguistics whose nuances
are dextrously explored in the ﬁrst chapter of the book.
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While Lacan’s most well-known axiom in his structuralist period was ‘the uncon-
scious is structured as a language’, his motto during his second return to Freud
could be encapsulated in the elusive statement ‘the unconscious is politics’ (p. 20).
The second axiom, Tomšič notes, attempts to overcome the opposition of structure
and politics. Rather than implying ‘politics is unconscious’ (which would suggest a
reduction of politics to unconscious processes), the copula is functions in a non-reﬂex-
ive way, indicating the formal inclusion of the subject of the unconscious in politics,
which, in the footsteps of Marx, entails constitution of social link through alienation
and negativity.
Structures March on the Streets
Lacan took issue with the way the supporters of May 1968 tended to oppose struc-
ture and the event/politics (as evident in the grafﬁti ‘structures do not march on the
streets’), failing to see the event as an eruption of the structural real. Abiding with
the fantasy of a pure real outside structure, they overlooked ‘the fact that the
demanded liberalisation, for instance of education, initiated a more direct commo-
diﬁcation of knowledge’ (p. 21). For Lacan, structure does not involve static and
necessary relations, but contingency and contradiction.1 From an epistemological
trajectory, revolution is deemed as a name for this ‘structural articulation of contra-
diction’ (p. 206). To bring this notion home, in the ﬁnal chapter of the book Tomšič
will discuss Lacan’s theorisation of the implications of May 1968 apropos of de
Gaulle’s university reform, meant as a response to the demand of the students.
Lacan saw the establishment of an experimental university in Vincennes (named
University Paris VIII afterwards) by de Gaulle’s Ministry of Education—where
the credit-point system was introduced—as a new stage in the evolution of capital-
ism, hence his forewarning words to his students: ‘The credit-point, the little piece
of paper that they want to issue you, is precisely this. It is the sign of what knowl-
edge will progressively become in this market that one calls the University’ (p. 212).
Lacan’s gesture does not merely evoke the commodiﬁcation of knowledge, but
rather signals to the structural congeniality between capitalism and science that
gives rise to the production of a capitalist subjectivity based on the grounding of
capitalist power relations on the social application of modern episteme. Lacan’s
warning about the absorption of the education system into the reproduction of
capitalism proves more realistic when we take into account the later privatisation
1 Alain Badiou, however, develops a critique of the structural dialectic of Lacan, challenging the latter’s con-
ception of the real as ‘the impasse of formalization’. Badiou reformulates the real as ‘the forced passage of a new
formalization’. In brief, Badiou inverts the Lacanian aphorism thus: ‘The formalization is the place where the real
passes in force’. The concept of ‘forcing’ is crucial to Badiou’s theorisation of the subject. For more details, see
Alain Badiou, Theory of the Subject, transl. Bruno Bosteels (New York: Continuum, 2009). See also Zachary
Luke Fraser, ‘The Category of Formalization: From Epistemological Break to Truth-Procedure’ in The Concept
of Model. An Introduction to the Materialist Epistemology of Mathematics, transl. Fraser and Tzuchein Tho (Mel-
bourne: Re-Press, 2007), (fn) I, II.
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of universities and the exponential rise of student loans (i.e. creation of indebted
students/subjects).
In Lacan’s second return to Freud, furthermore, the accent is displaced from rep-
resentation (Saussure) to production (Marx) and the revolutionary nucleus of the
Freudian theory—his labour theory of the unconscious—is stressed.2 This theory is
grounded on ‘the satisfaction of the unconscious tendency by the consumption of
psychic energy (labour-power) in the mental process’ (p. 47). Since it is difﬁcult to
do justice to Tomšič’s thoroughgoing account here, I turn to his delineation of the
logical (rather than analogical), epistemological and political continuity of Marx’s cri-
tique of political economy and Freud’s theory of libidinal economy. According to the
Lacanian thesis, the unconscious production of jouissance and the social production of
value follow the same logic and exhibit the same structural contradictions and dead-
locks. Instead of the repression of productive potentials of drives and desires, the insa-
tiable demand for production, production for the sake of production (Marx), becomes
the focal point.
Freud’s category of the unconscious production contains the Marxian insight into
the split character of labour, according to which labour is abstract matter or labour-
power in one glimpse, and concrete form or labour-process in another. Unconscious
labour is in this sense similar to abstract labour, because it cannot be linked to a con-
crete psychological agent (p. 101). The double character of commodities is mirrored in
the dividedness of satisfaction, that is, its coupling of ‘wish’ and ‘desire’. The separation
of labour from labourer in capitalism achieves the transformation of the subject into
labour-power. From a psychoanalytic trajectory, this objectiﬁcation of alienation, its
materialisation in commodity, turns the subject into an object that satisﬁes the
demand of the Other for production or extraction of surplus-object. Commodiﬁcation
of labour hence imposes a perverse position on the subject, turning the subject into the
object of the Other’s jouissance. Implicit in this conﬁguration of the subject is Lacan’s
conception of perversion.
The singularity of Tomšič’s analysis arises from the fact that it shows how Marx’s
labour theory of value actually reclaims the subject’s position, thus reformulating the
position of the subject in the sphere of commodity and puncturing the fantasy that
assumes capital as the true subject of the process of valorisation. The implications
of this analysis for radical politics cannot be overestimated, since it challenges the
view that bestows on capital the role of the subject, formerly occupied by the proletar-
iat. From the trajectory of emancipatory politics, if we were to give in to the idea of
capital as the subject, it would have been nearly impossible to defend any form of
emancipatory project relying on the agency of the masses. Marx’s labour theory of
value takes into account all the fetishistic fantasies involved in the process, thinking
the logic of value alongside a complex logic of fantasy that reveals the interdependence
of exploitation and mystiﬁcation of exploitation. For Marx, the individual affected by
2 This movement from representation to production is also a shift from the logic of language to that of
jouissance.
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capitalism is the same as the one who constitutes the subject of value, a hypothesis that
inverts the fetishistic hypothesis that attributes to capital the position of the subject of
capitalism (p.105). In the context of the industrial revolution, the industrial labourer
stood for the split in the subject of labour and the alienation implemented by the capi-
talist organisation of labour. Freud’s hysteric subject is analogous to Marx’s proletarian
subject in a given historical moment. Freud did not merely theorise the hysteric subject
as embodying the symptom, but as being the epistemological and social symptom.
In ontological terms, the minimal common ground betweenMarx and Freud is their
similar displacement of the ontological quandary. Both thinkers resort to the scientiﬁc
theory of entropy to account for the structural inconsistency in being. The asymmetry
between increase and decrease in being is therefore conceived in terms of the second
law of thermodynamics. From a Marxian trajectory, the capitalist social link has an
entropic quality. The accumulation of capital is coupled with the accumulation of
misery, and the revolution of the means of production is inseparable from the pro-
duction of a surplus population (p. 70). For both thinkers, the autonomy of symbolic
networks (their independence from consciousness) is indicative of two implications: ‘a
subject, whose being comes down to non-identity and loss, and a surplus-object,
whose being is marked by intensiﬁcation or increase’ (p. 200).
This basic imbalance between the lack-in-being and the surplus-in-being can be
expressed in terms of a parallax of subjective loss and objective surplus. This is
helpful in grasping the difference between lack and excess in Lacanian taxonomy,
which at times could give rise to some confusion. Most important, this ontological
point of departure allows us to detect a parallax in Marx’s critique of political
economy, which undertakes neither the subjective position (the humanist Marx of
the theory of alienation) nor the objective position (the economist Marx of the theories
of value), but occupies the split between the two (p. 204). Critique in this sense
emerges as having a parallax structure, articulating the concomitance of the pro-
duction-oriented labour theory of value and market fetishism.
‘The Original Sin’ of Primitive Accumulation
Revisiting Marx’s theory of ‘the so-called primitive accumulation of capital’, the text
conﬁrms the continuous character of primitive accumulation expounded in the
more recent reformulations of this category.3 This reading, however, emphasises the
inextricability of jouissance and debt (pp. 141–148). The ‘myth’ of primitive accumu-
lation, as maintained by classical political economy, associates enjoyment with the
proto-proletarian and renunciation with the proto-capitalist. Historically, it so
3 Various recent reformulation of the category of primitive accumulation stress the continuous character of
primitive accumulation. In a word, this category does not merely address a historical, ‘originary’ accumulation.
See Massimo De Angelis, ‘Separating the Doing and the Deed: Capital and the Continuous Character of the
Enclosures’, Historical Materialism, 12:2 (2004), pp. 57–87; Michael Perelman, The Invention of Capitalism: Clas-
sical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2000); David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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appears that the capitalist accumulated the ﬁrst wealth through saving, whereas the
proletarian enjoyed excessively until all he was left with was his labour-power.
While abstinence and renunciation are supposed to accumulate surplus-value,
labour-power (which originates from excess) only generates debt. This resonates
with the logic of austerity in our time, which is inﬂicted with the same political–econ-
omic myth: the global South appears as the land of enjoying lazy subjects who become
increasingly indebted, while the global North (particularly Germany) stands for the
land of saving and regeneration of wealth. So assumed, accumulation of wealth pre-
supposes renunciation of jouissance.
Marx’s correction of this tale, however, discloses that the complicity between renun-
ciation and the production of jouissance is achieved through generalised indebting or
the invention of national debt. In other words, the imperative of abstinence is at heart
the imperative of debting (via public or national credit, which creates proﬁt out of
indebting). This association of debt and jouissance originates from religion, which is
why Marx speaks of ‘the original sin’ of primitive accumulation. Marx’s focus on
national debt afﬁrms the emergence of labour-power as a capitalist form of subjectivity
that corresponds to the system of abstract debt and the modern credit system. The
citizen as debtor is a quantiﬁable and exploitable subjectivity that is always already
indebted and produced per se. Whereas a ‘bad’ capitalist keeps his proﬁt for himself
in a miserly fashion, a ‘good’ capitalist grasps the logic of proﬁt through indebting
(p. 217). To put it differently, a clumsy capitalist has a pre-Freudian conception of
jouissance as the ordinary pleasure of consuming and spending, while a shrewd capi-
talist knows that jouissance goes beyond the pleasure principle and reaches its peak in
indebting, risk management and speculation. Hence, Marx’s refutation of the fantastic
projection of some hypothetical subject of jouissance prior to the subject of abstract
debt.
Tomšič, however, does not dwell on the predicament of periodisation in relation to
capitalism. How does the passage from feudalism to capitalism take place? Had this so-
called transition been as deﬁant and bloody as thinkers like Silvia Federici show (the
thesis of capitalism as the counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities that had
emerged from anti-feudal struggle),4 the process of appropriating the body and disci-
plining labour at the rise of capitalism would have deeply affected the subsequent con-
stitution of capitalist subjectivity. What were the implications of sexual division of
labour (such as the instrumentalisation of women for reproductive work or re-articu-
lation of the patriarchal order) for the libidinal economy at the rise of capitalism?
Reﬂection on this moment of so-called ‘transition’, on the impact of the social trans-
formation that came with the rise of capitalism, is missing in The Capitalist
Unconscious.
It would be equally pertinent to stress the political dimension of primitive accumu-
lation as the meeting point of the two pillars of domination: capital and state. Contra
4 Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, The Body And Primitive Accumulation (New York:
Autonomedia, 2004).
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accumulation, which is essentially grounded on the economic relations that enable the
domination of the capitalist over worker, the separation implemented by primitive
accumulation is primarily enforced by ‘the direct extra-economic force’ of the state
or certain sections of social classes (in most cases, this means the force of the state
and the law to dispossess).5 This point of convergence between the two logics of dom-
ination (capital and state) is the site where dissent and struggle take shape. As such,
social and political struggles pose a limit to accumulation, or in de Angelis’s words,
primitive accumulation ‘acquires meaning through patterns of resistance and struggle’.
In the context of The Capitalist Unconscious, it would be productive to explore the
contribution of the state in the production of the indebted subject alongside capital.
The Cult of Debt and Beyond
This correlation between jouissance and debt is reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s deli-
neation of capitalism as a cult of indebting in the fragment ‘Capitalism as Religion’.6
Rather than describing capitalism as an outcome or effect of religion (Max Weber),
Benjamin regards the two as analogous and providing a response to the same ‘cares,
torments and troubles’.7 Accordingly, capitalism is a cult-religion that does not
expiate but produce guilt/debt (Schuld): ‘This cult is… culpabilizing. Capitalism is pre-
sumably the ﬁrst case of a religion that does not atone but produces guilt.’8 Tomšič’s
investigation actually supports Benjamin’s conception of capitalism as religion,
because the passage to capitalism is described in terms of the dissolution of the
master’s discourse and its evacuation and abstraction (p. 145). Suggestive in this move-
ment is the weakening of economic–metaphysical roots of subjection to the feudal lord
or monarch as divine representatives (the master-signiﬁer in Lacan’s parlance). Even
so, this new discursive production (termed as ‘the university discourse’) did not over-
throw the old structures of inequality and domination, but merely replaced the serf
with abstract labour-power and the old master with the new one, i.e. the capitalist.
The difference is to be sought in the de-fetishisation of the master/capitalist, in the
way the new master loses its concrete personiﬁcation under capitalism.
We could conclude that mastery becomes ubiquitous abstraction, in the same way
that law becomes life in the absence of the ‘mediation’ of the Church (in the passage
from Catholicism to Protestantism) in Benjamin’s terms.9 Like Protestantism, capital-
ism embodies its own meaning without any reference to an external source and in this
sense stands for a peculiar kind of cult. The abstraction of economic categories under
5 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976), pp. 879, 899–900. See also Massimo De Angelis, ‘Marx
and Primitive Accumulation: The Continuous Character of Capital’s “Enclosures”’, The Commoner, 2 (September
2001), pp. 9, 16.
6 Walter Benjamin, ‘Capitalism as Religion’ in Michael W. Jennings (ed.)Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings
Vol. 1, 1913–1926 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 288.
7 Ibid., p. 100.
8 Ibid., p. 288.
9 Ibid., p. 290.
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capitalism is reproduced in the abstraction and ‘immediacy’ of political discourse, and
revolutionary movements fade into democratic and identitarian politics.
In ‘Capitalism as Religion’, Benjamin points out the continuity between Freudian
psychoanalysis and ‘the priestly domination’ of the cult of capitalism. The link
between capitalism as cult-religion and psychoanalysis is established through the
notion of guilt/debt (Schuld) at work in both. ‘The repressed’ is deemed comparable
to capital, since it ‘pays interest on the hell of the unconscious’.10 Capital and the
repressed both seem to cultivate and accumulate debt/guilt. We may ask whether
the same criticism could be levelled against Lacan. If we listen to clinical psychoana-
lysts, the Lacanian teaching seems to come full circle to the discourse of the analyst at
the end.11 Everyone becomes a proletarian and the distinction between the capitalist
and the worker vanishes.12 No horizon is to be hoped for beyond the couch. Benja-
min’s objection to Freud comes to haunt Lacan as well, for debt/guilt cannot be
eluded unless it is wholly overthrown. It cannot be negotiated through accumulation
of analyses and rectiﬁcations. Let us imagine Germany and Greece playing the part of
the analyst and the analysand respectively. Negotiation of debt could only lead to
accumulation of more debt and more guilt. The only possibility for overcoming
debt is its removal. Tomšič’s Marxist reformulation of psychoanalytic theory draws
Freud and Lacan closer to this liberatory, Benjaminian insight. In his approach, we
catch a glimpse of a materialist theory of the subject beyond the narcissistic, individu-
alist, confessional mode, a ﬁgure of subjectivity that renews our hope for a political
universalism beyond the commodity form.
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10 Ibid., p. 289.
11 Lacan deﬁned the analyst’s discourse as the envers of the master’s discourse, because it is meant to be the
only discourse that ultimately produces the total inversion of the relations of domination. Yet, there is a tendency
(particularly in clinical practice) to interpret this primacy of the analytic discourse as conﬁned to traversing the
fundamental fantasy on the level of the individual, i.e. patient. The sociopolitical scope of the analyst’s discourse
(where the entire culture is placed on the couch) is thus overlooked. It is noteworthy that Lacan’s notion of dis-
course, which was initially synonymous to ‘speech’, came to signify Marx’s ‘mode of production’ in his later
thought (p. 203).
12 This suggests that the subject is no longer exploited by the capitalist, but by the objects of libidinal enjoy-
ment. See Frédéric Declercq, ‘Lacan on the Capitalist Discourse: Its Consequences for Libidinal Enjoyment and
Social Bonds’, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society, 11 (2006), pp. 74–83.
314 B. Emadian
